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Abstract 
 
The stock market crash of 1929 stands today as the largest decline in market 
value in the history of the United States. Consequently, the event destroyed the 
wealth of thousands of American families and institutions. On October 28th and 
29th, the United States stock market fell 11.3 percent and 12.4 percent 
respectively, marking the beginning of a down market that lasted over three years, 
the time period known today as the Great Depression. This paper empirically 
analyzes the effects felt by each individual industry sector in the crash of 1929, 
identifying gross and abnormal returns over three major days in the crash. I then 
compare my findings to previous literature and economic theories, analyzing 
which sector returns were expected and which were abnormal.  
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1.)  Introduction  
 
The stock market crash of 1929 stands alone as the largest fall of market 
value in United States history. Marking the beginning of the Great Depression, the 
U.S. plunged into a state of panic from its previous period of rapid growth and 
positivity during the “Roaring Twenties” (Pettinger, 2007). Known as “Black 
Monday” and “Black Tuesday”, the market fell 11.2 percent and 11.9 percent 
respectively. From its peak in mid-September of 1929 to halfway through 1932, 
the market lost over 85 percent of its value.  
While there have been studies that have explored the reasons for the 1929 
stock market crash (see for example, Galbraith 1954 and Bierman 1998), to the 
best of my knowledge, no empirical research on sector performance during the 
1929 crash has been conducted. This is probably due to the lack of daily stock 
data for 1929. With daily data now available on 17 sectors daily dating back to 
1926 (French, 2016), I can analyze the effects of the Great Crash of 1929 on 
different sectors of the stock market.    
I use data on the daily stock returns for each sector leading up to and 
following the crash in October of 1929.  I focus on three specific days, October 
28th, 29th, and 30th of 1929, because each of these days had a market swing of over 
10 percent. Unlike earlier literature that provides a general summary of the effects 
felt by various industrial sectors, I employ standard event study techniques in 
finance to measure gross and abnormal returns for all 17 sectors.  
My study yields the gross and abnormal returns for each separate industry 
sector. For the 3-day cumulative gross returns from October 28th to October 30th, 
1929, the sectors least affected were Construction (negative 7.99 percent), 
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Transportation (negative 8.06 percent), and Consumer Goods (negative 8.09 
percent). Sectors impacted the most were Chemicals (negative 20.30 percent), 
Finance (negative 18.94 percent), and Machines (negative 16.69 percent). These 
returns are compared to the overall market which fell 12.45 percent. For the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns, the top performers were Cars (positive 5.03 
percent), Construction (positive 4.88 percent), and Consumer Goods (positive 
2.69 percent). The worst performers were Chemicals (negative 5.85 percent), 
Retail (negative 5.43 percent), and Mines (negative 5.22 percent). My findings 
allow me to use empirical analysis to compare individual industry sector 
performance across 17 sectors, using the results to explain variations in 
performance versus previous economic literature and arguments.  
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2.   Literature Review 
 
There are many theories surrounding the causes for the Stock Market 
Crash of 1929. Galbraith (1954) argues that one major reason for the 
occurrence of the crash was the incredible speculation on the New York Stock 
Exchange. He states that as the boom began in the early years of the 1920’s, 
individuals as well as institutional investors began to greatly increase their 
trading activity. This increase in activity caused a rise in stock values across 
the board, building up to a culture of Americans buying large volumes of 
stocks not for their returns, but rather for quick resale at inflated prices 
(Galbriath, 1954). To make the situation worse, the speculative trading was 
largely done on credit, creating a massive underlying bubble that was waiting 
to pop. Thus, when the stock market began to turn grim in the fall of 1929, 
stockbrokers were required to issue margin calls, which caused panic selling 
that resulted in the tumbling of the stock market. While Galbraith (1954) does 
no empirical analysis on different sectors of the market during 1929, he does 
speak to the effect it had on the purchasing power of individuals of the time. 
He states that the crash resulted in consumers cutting purchases, manufacturers 
cutting back production, and employers choosing to lay-off workers. The 
financial sector was brought down with their issues of credit, and that resulted 
in the bankruptcy of many banks. The economy was left in a state where 
money was tight and purchasing power was low.  
 White (1989) revisits the United States stock market crash of 1929 by 
compiling numerous sources focused on the catalysts of the crash. He suggests 
that speculation was indeed a factor because of America’s use of credit and 
investment trusts, contributing to higher trading activity and high valuations of 
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stocks. He attributes market fundamentals as the initial cause of the bubble, but 
goes on to argue that they were never strong enough to sustain the rapid growth 
in valuations of stocks. He cites the work of Sirkin (1975), that stated that high 
stock prices and high price-to-earnings ratios were a consequence of expected 
rapid growth of earnings. In particular, White (1989) shows this by creating a 
graph of stock prices vs. dividends for all the major companies in the Dow-
Jones Index from 1926 – 1929. Leading up to 1928, there was a minimal gap 
between the two, but from 1928 – 1929, the gap increased massively. The start 
of this increase was attributed by White (1989) to when the market was 
becoming over-valued. He explains how the increase in stock prices vs. the 
hesitancy of managers to increase dividends meant that the managers knew that 
their revenue growth was not sustainable, showing that they did not share the 
same enthusiasm as the general public. He also shares that previous economists 
have argued that the crash began in the public utilities sector, which was 
extremely popular at the time and had experienced massive growth leading up 
to October, but he says that there is not enough evidence for proof of this 
theory. 
 Bierman (1998) explores the reasons for the “Great Crash” in an attempt 
to give the reader a better understanding of the events that unfolded during the 
last days of October, 1929. He highlights that speculation was the common 
belief for the explanation of the crash during that time period, (see for example, 
Keynes 1930 and Hoover 1950), but he did not agree with this explanation. He 
states that one major reason to reject the belief of speculation is to study the 
reactions of leading economists of the time. Specifically, he shows that both 
Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes, considered leading economists of the 
1920’s, were bullish before and after the crash in October, 1929. Neither 
profited from their views, and lost heavily over the crashing market. Therefore, 
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the belief is that it was not just “fools” and speculators that drove stock prices 
up, but rather economic indicators that supported their growth. 
 Bierman (1998) also touches on the growth and expansion of investment 
trusts as a reason for the crash. He takes an article from The Economist in 1929 
that reported that $1 billion of investment trusts were sold in the first 8 months 
of 1929, compared to the entire year of 1928’s total of $400 million, 
illustrating their increasing popularity. These trusts acted similar to the mutual 
funds of today, where small investors were able to pool their money in order to 
achieve greater diversification. The problem with these trusts was that they 
were highly levered, and were particularly vulnerable to stock price declines. 
At the time, these trusts were considered reliable because of their experienced 
management and ability to diversify portfolios, but a diversification of stocks 
during that time period could not stand the burden of large universal price 
declines. Bierman (1998) goes on to explain how certain information would be 
extremely helpful in order to better explain the effects caused by investment 
trusts. He states that information such as the percentage of the portfolio that 
were public utilities, the extent of their diversification, the percentage of 
portfolios that were NYSE firms, and the amount of debt and preferred stock 
leverage used would be extremely insightful. 
 To the best of my knowledge, however, there are no papers specifically 
examining the sectoral effects in 1929. Despite this, one can gain some insight 
on the sectoral effects from the aforementioned discussed thus far. Bierman 
(1998) states that during the time leading up to October, 1929, stock prices did 
not rise across all industries. He explains that stock prices rose most in 
industries where economic fundamentals illustrated a reason for public 
optimism. These sectors included airplanes, agriculture, chemicals, department 
stores, steel, utilities, telephones/telegraph, electrical equipment, oil, paper, and 
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radio. Richardson (2013) also concluded that automobiles, telephones, and 
other new technologies were experiencing rapid growth leading up to the crash. 
Due to their success and expansion during the 1920’s, Bierman (1998) comes 
to the conclusion that these were reasonable choices for further sectoral 
growth. In his writing, he focuses specifically on public utilities, citing 
Wigmore (1985) who concluded that at the time of the crash the sector was 
trading at three times its book value, an indication he argued hinted at a bubble. 
 I attached below a graph of individual sector value in the nine months 
leading up to the crash. I created this graph using the daily returns given by 
Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio sample for each industry sector starting 
in January of 1929. The purpose of this graph is to illustrate the sectors that 
were experiencing high growth leading up to the crash. The graph illustrates 
how sectors such as Utilities, Machines, and Chemicals were experiencing very 
high growth in the months leading up to the crash, while industries such as 
Cars and Cloths were experiencing significant losses. 
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Figure 1. 
Data taken from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio’s (French, 2016) 
The goal of this paper is to research the returns of each sector during this stock 
market crash, and provide an explanation for abnormal returns across the market. 
While economists focused mainly on the Public Utility and Financial sectors 
during the crash, this paper will expand the research to 17 sectors during the 1929 
stock crash, explicitly examining the returns of each individual one. 
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3.) Data 
 
I use data from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios sample (French, 
2016). The data set is ideal for my purposes because it tracks the daily returns of 
17 sectors from 1926 through 2015 in the United States. I argue that the 17 
industry sectors accurately divide and capture the entire U.S. financial market 
during this time period. The industry sectors variables include; Food, Mines 
(Mining and Minerals), Oil (Oil and Petroleum products), Clothes (Textiles, 
Apparel & Footwear), Durables (Consumer Durables), Chemicals (Chemicals), 
Consumer (Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco), Construction (Construction and 
Construction Materials), Steel (Steel Works etc.), Fabricated Products, Machinery 
(Machinery and Business Equipment), Cars (Automobiles), Transportation, 
Utilities, Retail (Retail Stores), Finance (Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other 
Financials), and Other. I created 3 dummy variables to account for the two days 
where the market experiences extreme losses, October 28th and 29th, as well as the 
following day of October 30th, where the market experienced a massive recovery 
gain. Attached below are the summary statistics I gathered from French’s data set 
of the three major days of extreme market returns versus the 17 industry sectors as 
a whole. Table 1 illustrates how there was a wide range of returns posted across 
all the industry sectors. 
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Table 1. 
Sample Statistics: Industry Sectors vs. Market Returns 
Data taken from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio’s (French, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date
28-Oct-29 29-Oct-29 30-Oct-29
Market Return (0.1127)                  (0.1199)                           0.1218                         
Sector Return Mean (0.1112)                  (0.1162)                           0.1113                         
Standard Error 0.0095                    0.0108                             0.0108                         
Median Return (0.1073)                  (0.1207)                           0.1204                         
Standard Deviation 0.0392                    0.0445                             0.0445                         
Sample Variance 0.1533                    0.1978                             0.1983                         
Range 0.1491                    0.1842                             0.1796                         
Minimum (0.1729)                  (0.1917)                           0.0272                         
Maximum (0.0238)                  (0.0075)                           0.2068                         
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4.) Empirical Strategy 
 
To formally test the effects of the crash on each industry sector, I examine each 
sector individually and compare it to the market in terms of its gross returns and 
impact of the three major days of the market crash. Thus, the return for each 
industry sector is estimated from a linear regression of the following form 
(1)         𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 =  α +  β𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  +  β𝑑𝑑1 + β𝑑𝑑2 + β𝑑𝑑3 +  ℇ𝑖𝑖 
where Si  is the return for the specific industry sector, mkt  is the market return, d1  
is a dummy variable accounting for October 28th, 1929, d2 is a dummy variable 
accounting for October 29th, 1929, and d3 is a dummy variable accounting for 
October 30th, 1929. 
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5.) Results 
 
The following pages explore my results for each individual industry sector’s 
performance versus the market. Table 2 below describes the results found through 
each regression of the respective industry sector. This table also illustrates the 
impact of each date I analyzed using dummy variables and the coefficients they 
produced. The coefficients of the three specific days explains the abnormal 
returns for that industry sector on that specific day. The table is sorted by the 3-
day abnormal return for each sector, starting from the worst overall abnormal 
return. The 3-day abnormal return was calculated using the sum of the three 
coefficients from the three days that I am studying. As the economists I 
referenced suggested, the utilities industry sector had been experiencing extreme 
growth leading up the crash, but what is interesting is that the abnormal returns 
for that sector for each individual day were not too extreme. Utilities largest 
abnormal return was just over 3 percent, on October 29th, suggesting that overall 
the sector’s performance was mostly in-line with market expectations. The same 
can be said for the Oil and Steel sectors, where their abnormal returns were 
comparatively minimal. On the other hand, a few of the industries experienced 
massive abnormal returns during these three days. Construction for example took 
a huge hit on the first day, October 28th, posting an abnormal negative return of 
over 6.3 percent. The next day, it posted an even bigger abnormal return of over 
10 percent, except this time it was in the positive direction. On October 29th, the 
Mining sector took the largest hit, posting a negative abnormal return of over 8 
percent. For the last day, the two sectors that posted the biggest abnormal returns 
were the Durables and Cars sectors. Durables posted a negative abnormal return 
of over 7.3 percent on October 30th, which is not surprising given the nature of 
durable goods in a tight market. What is surprising is the abnormal positive return 
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of the Cars sector of over 7 percent, since the automobile industry is composed of 
high ticket items. The abnormal returns of each date and sector can be found 
below. 
Table 2. 
Linear Regression Output 
  Data taken from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio’s (French, 2016) 
 
 
 
Mkt Beta Standard Deviation Oct 28 (Coef.) Oct 29 (Coef.) Oct 30 (Coef.) 3-Day Ab Return α
Industry Sector
Chemicals 1.1449 0.0666 (0.0142) (0.0548) 0.0106 (0.0583) 0.0003
Retail 0.8830 0.0343 (0.0008) (0.0098) (0.0437) (0.0543) (0.0010)
Mines 0.3950 0.0822 0.0211 (0.0847) 0.0114 (0.0522) (0.0004)
Cloths 0.5384 0.0627 0.0058 (0.0057) (0.0368) (0.0367) (0.0015)
Machines 1.1123 0.0481 (0.0248) 0.0064 (0.0139) (0.0323) 0.0004
Fabrics 1.0844 0.0884 (0.0022) (0.0146) (0.0102) (0.0270) 0.0003
Finance 1.2574 0.0773 (0.0141) (0.0232) 0.0136 (0.0238) (0.0011)
Other 1.0031 0.0508 (0.0213) 0.0067 (0.0026) (0.0172) 0.0008
Durables 1.3244 0.1595 0.0420 0.0264 (0.0731) (0.0047) (0.0000)
Transportation 0.6798 0.0368 0.0051 0.0119 (0.0202) (0.0033) 0.0005
Steel 0.9805 0.0625 0.0113 0.0179 (0.0212) 0.0081 0.0002
Food 0.8969 0.05241 (0.0035) (0.0134) 0.0288 0.0119 0.0003
Oil 0.9576 0.0991 0.0218 0.0131 (0.0158) 0.0191 0.0008
Utilities 1.3258 0.0612 (0.0030) 0.0337 (0.0114) 0.0193 (0.0001)
Consumer 0.9206 0.2072 0.0129 0.0313 (0.0173) 0.0269 0.0009
Construction 0.9704 0.07978 (0.0634) 0.1090 0.0027 0.0483 (0.0001)
Cars 1.1418 0.103 0.0115 (0.0313) 0.0702 0.0503 (0.0024)
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Table 3 focuses on the gross returns of each industry sector versus the market. 
The first three columns are the returns for each individual day of the crash. The 
fourth column describes the 3-day gross return of each industry sector for the 
period of October 28th through the 30th. The table is sorted by sector performance 
based on its 3-day gross return, starting with the worst individual industry 
performance which was Chemicals. 
The performance of the Chemicals sector is interesting because of the lack of 
attention it was given by previous literature. Posting an overall 3-day negative 
gross return of more than 20 percent, the sector took the largest dip out of all of 
the 17, but the reaction of this sector is expected in a downturn of an economy. 
The second worst performing industry sector was Finance. I expected this because 
of previous literature and because a large negative reaction to the Finance sector 
is common in financial crisis’s. Other sectors that fell in-line with my 
expectations were the Consumer Goods and Oil sectors. Since these industries are 
composed of goods that are necessities, their solid performance compared to the 
market was not unexpected. Two industries predicted to feel large negative effects 
were the Utilities and Durables sectors. Surprisingly, even though both sectors 
lost roughly 15 percent of their value over the 3-day period, their returns were not 
comparatively abnormal and very in-line with market expectations. The focus of 
Bierman (1998) and White (1989) on the Utilities sector made me anticipate a 
greater negative return by the industry. The most surprising performance was the 
Construction sector. Construction performed the best compared to the other 16 
sectors, posting a 3-day negative gross return of only 8 percent. Perhaps this can 
be explained by the industry sector’s performance leading up to the crash. Shown 
in Figure 1, Construction performed well below the market in the months leading 
up to the crash. Therefore, there is a possibility that the market had already 
adjusted for a decline in the Construction sector and as a result, the crash’s impact 
was minimal. Even though the returns were middle of the road, the Cars sector 
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performed well compared to my expectations, considering automobiles are high 
ticket items. An explanation to this could be the popularity of automobiles at the 
time, since it was not a common item to be held by the average household. 
Table 3. 
Individual Sector Daily & Gross Returns 
 
  Oct. 28 Oct. 29 Oct. 30 3 Day Gross Return 
Market (0.1129) (0.1201) 0.1216  (0.1245) 
Industry Sector 
   
  
Chemicals (0.1429) (0.1917) 0.1504  (0.2030) 
Finance (0.1569) (0.1751) 0.1656  (0.1894) 
Machines  (0.1498) (0.1266) 0.1219  (0.1669) 
Fabrics (0.1242) (0.1444) 0.1221  (0.1592) 
Durables (0.1073) (0.1324) 0.0881  (0.1573) 
Retail (0.1013) (0.1167) 0.0628  (0.1563) 
Utilities  (0.1526) (0.1254) 0.1499  (0.1478) 
Other (0.1335) (0.1128) 0.1204  (0.1387) 
Cars  (0.1197) (0.1707) 0.2068  (0.1190) 
Steel (0.0990) (0.0995) 0.0984  (0.1088) 
Food (0.1043) (0.1207) 0.1383  (0.1035) 
Mines (0.0238) (0.1324) 0.0591  (0.1030) 
Cloths (0.0564) (0.0718) 0.0272  (0.1003) 
Oil (0.0853) (0.1009) 0.1016  (0.0940) 
Consumer  (0.0900) (0.0782) 0.0957  (0.0809) 
Transportation (0.0710) (0.0691) 0.0631  (0.0806) 
Construction (0.1729) (0.0075) 0.1208  (0.0799) 
  Data taken from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio’s (French, 2016) 
15 
 
 
After calculating the gross and abnormal returns for each sector, I was 
particularly interested in the Finance sector. From previous literature, the Banking 
sector was mentioned to be hit particularly hard. With investment trusts also 
mentioned by multiple pieces of literature, I expected the Trading sub-sector to 
experience massive losses as well. Using data form Kenneth French’s 48 Industry 
Portfolio’s, I was able to obtain the data needed to run the same regressions I had 
previously ran, but with 3 sub-sectors of Finance. These sectors include, Banking, 
Insurance, and Trading. Table 4 illustrates my results. As predicted, both the 
Banking and Trading sector took a massive hit. Banking was hit hard especially 
on the first day, October 28th, where it posted a negative abnormal return of over 9 
percent. It is important to point out that the Trading Sector had very minimal 
abnormal returns, which could be attributed to the previously stated idea that 
investment trusts were largely responsible for the possible speculation in the 
market. 
Table 4. 
Finance Sub-Sector Performance 
  Data taken from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolio’s (French, 2016) 
 
  Oct. 28 Oct. 29 Oct. 30 
3 Day 
Gross 
Oct. 28 
(Ab) 
Oct. 29 
(Ab) 
Oct. 30 
(Ab) 
3 Day Ab 
Return 
Market (0.1129) (0.1201) 0.1216  (0.1245) 
   
  
Industry Sector 
       
  
Fin(Banking) (0.2043) (0.1468) 0.1906  (0.1917) (0.0971) (0.0330) 0.0821  (0.0480) 
Fin(Insurance) (0.1504) (0.1496) 0.1235  (0.1883) (0.0255) (0.0167) (0.0123) (0.0544) 
Fin(Trading) (0.1870) (0.2207) 0.2328  (0.2189) (0.0061) (0.0283) 0.0390  0.0046  
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I then created a graph for each industry sector versus the market in terms of 
overall gross returns. Each graph starts at the peak of the market, which is in the 
middle of September, 1929. The graphs continue until the end of 1929, capturing 
the 3 major days of discussion and providing the 1929 year-ending value of each 
industry sector. The purpose of these graphs are to compare sector performance 
for the 3 days in focus versus the last 2 months of 1929. Particularly interesting is 
the year ending performance of the Construction sector versus the Consumer 
Goods sector. While both sectors performed relatively well during the 3 major 
days of market swings, their year-end performances were drastically different. 
Construction performance mimicked the overall market, but Consumer Goods 
greatly outperformed. This can probably be explained by the nature of Consumer 
Goods being a necessity good that will always have demand from the market. The 
Machine sector on the other hand was the 3rd worst performing sector in the crash, 
but recovered back towards the average market return by the end of 1929. All 
sector comparisons are shown below. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 4. 
 
Figure 5. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 6. 
 
Figure 7. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 10. 
 
Figure 11. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 12. 
 
Figure 13. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 14. 
 
Figure 15. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 16. 
 
Figure 17. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data used for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios 
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Figure 18. 
 
Figure 19. 
 
              
__________________ 
Notes: The data used for Figure 18 is from Kenneth French’s 17 Industry Portfolios, 
Figure 19 uses data from Kenneth French’s 48 Industry Portfolios, 
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Figure 20. 
 
Figure 21. 
 
              __________________ 
Notes: The data taken for both graphs are from Kenneth French’s 48 Industry Portfolios 
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To further analyze the impact each industry sector felt after the crash, I 
created a graph that compared all 17 industry sectors to the market through the 
Great Depression. I again started from the peak of the market in September of 
1929, but this time I used data through the end of 1932. My findings were mostly 
in-line with expectations. Consumer Goods out-performed every other industry 
sector by a large margin, while Consumer Durables as well as Financials were 
consistent under-performers throughout the entire 3-year span. Attached below is 
the comparative graph.  
Figure 22.  
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6.) Conclusion 
 
The era of growth and prosperity of the 1920’s ended with the unparalleled 
market downfall in the stock market crash of 1929 (Richardson, 2013). With data 
previously unavailable, sectoral effects during the crash can now be described 
empirically. I formally analyze the effects of the United States Stock Market 
Crash on October 28th, 29th, and 30th, 1929, on 17 industry sectors across the 
entire market. The market lost over 12.45 percent of its value on those three days, 
motivating my research to discover which industry sectors were affected the most. 
Using Kenneth French’s 17 Industry’s Portfolio data, I examine daily returns from 
the U.S. stock market from 1929 through 1933, allowing me to observe the 
sectoral effects from not only the crash, but also the time period of the Great 
Depression. I argue that certain industry sectors such as finance, utilities, and 
consumer durables would take major hits to their sector value, this is in line with 
the work of Galbraith (1954) and Bierman (1998). On the other hand, I argue 
industry sectors that encompassed necessities would perform well through the 
crash, such as consumer goods and transportation, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis of citizen’s loss of purchasing powering in the work of Galbraith 
(1954). 
In general, my findings are consistent with my arguments above. The main 
exception is the Construction sector, which performed abnormally well 
throughout the crash. I conclude that the reason for this abnormality was the 
sector’s decline in value during the earlier months of 1929, therefore the market’s 
correction during the crash had an impact that was not as severe as it was on the 
other industry sectors.   
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To further my research, I analyzed 3 specific industry sub-sectors of Finance 
industry sector; Banking, Insurance, and Trading. My findings illustrated that the 
Banking and Trading sectors took abnormally large hits during the crash, which 
was in-line with the research of Bierman (1998). I graphed individual sector 
returns versus the market through the end of 1929, as well as all 17 industry 
sectors together versus the market through the end of 1932, with the intent to 
discover if sector performance during the crash was an indication of future 
performance through the Great Depression. My findings proved that industry 
sectors generally reverted back to what economic literature would consider as the 
typical recession response for that industry.  
For future research, the correlation between stock returns by sector to future 
industry productions could be examined. Schwert (1990) stated that there is a 
strong positive relation between real stock returns and future production rates. By 
matching the returns of the sectors I analyzed to industrial data, a study could be 
done to see if Schwert’s (1990) theory holds true in the months following the 
market crash of 1929, specifically through the Great Depression. Overall, my 
findings now allow industry sector returns during the 1929 United States Stock 
Market Crash to be empirically described. To the best of my knowledge, no 
empirical study has been done to the extent to which I have gone.   
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